Back to bank: Digital payments, deposits' substitution & credit

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QCGBF annual conference

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"Big picture" question of my agenda:

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What specific frictions and constraints prevent the development of financial markets in LMICs?

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What specific frictions and constraints prevent the development of financial markets in LMICs?

Can policy affect these, if so how?





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✓ Beyond payments: risk-sharing, savings, remittances



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X Less on regulation



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Less on regulation

Digital Money Tax



mobile money could backfire

2/36

Peter Quartey



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Digital Money Tax



√ Financing rising national debt



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Digital Money Tax

Local Markets

Kenya's mobile-money growth hits 16-year low following DOUGH RISING

government tax move

Kenyans return to cash as taxes raised on digital payments



Mobile money agents threaten shutdown over "unbearable" double taxation



- √ Financing rising national debt
- √ Formalizing informal economy



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"It's a lazy tax": Why African governments' obsession with mobile money could backfire

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Digital Money Tax

Local Warkets

Kenya's mobile-money growth

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Kenyans re

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Mobile money agents threaten shutdown over "unbearable" double taxation



MODERN CHANA

"It's a lazy tax": Why African governments' obsession with mobile money could backfire


- √ Financing rising national debt
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- X Easy tax, but who is burdened?
- X Competition w/ traditional banks?

Research Question

Do digital currencies disintermediate banks?


Research Question

Do digital currencies disintermediate banks?



Credit market?

Do digital currencies disintermediate banks?



Credit market?

Financial inclusion?

Toy model of currency substitution:

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Tradeoff between conveniency of storage & transaction cost

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4 Identification:

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Tax: Unexpected shock to the cost of Mobile Money

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Tax: Unexpected shock to the cost of Mobile Money Geographical heterogeneity in access to Mobile Money substitutes

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Innovations:

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Final outcomes:

Liquidity shock to banks ⇒ Change in credit provision

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
User


Banks


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
Cash


Mobile Money














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


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
Not safe to keep the money under the mattress

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
Why did bank deposits never take up before? What's new?

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
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


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
Where do bank deposits grow the most?



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
Paper in 1 picture

Mobile Money, new deposits & the Tax




Paper in 1 picture

Mobile Money, bank deposits inflow & the Tax



Paper in 1 picture

Mobile Money, bank deposits inflow & the Tax



Mixed theoretical effects of digital currency (CBDC) on banks' intermediation

Andolfatto et al. (2021), Agur et al. (2022), Chiu et al. (2023)

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Mobile Money & Regulation

Jack and Suri (2011, 2014, 2016), Blumenstock et al. (2016), Riley (2018), Breza et al (2022), Brunnermeier, Limodio & Spadavecchia (2023)

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 \Longrightarrow Our contribution: administrative individual level data & effects of widely discussed policy

1. Data & Identification

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2. Empirical Analysis

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- First stage: Mobile Money vs Bank Deposits & Cash

1. Data & Identification

2. Empirical Analysis

- First stage: Mobile Money vs Bank Deposits & Cash
- Second stage: Credit Market

Data & Identification

Mobile Money Transactions

- 2 billion transactions in 2018
- 20 million users ⇒

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- ullet 20 million users \Longrightarrow random 2 million geolocated

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Ugandan National Panel Survey

• 3'000 households

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New banking technology - monthly

deposits at district level (136 districts)

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Banks' balance sheets - monthly/quarterly

• 26 banks

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New banking technology - monthly

deposits at district level (136 districts)

Banks' balance sheets - monthly/quarterly

26 banks

Credit registry - monthly

- 2 million loans
- borrower: location, demographics, credit history



Time variation: (unexpected) Mobile Money Tax Unexpected Tax ⇒ induces shift in technology

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⇒ induces shift in technology

Geographical variation: presence of ATMs

 $\Longrightarrow {\sf complementarity} \ {\sf facilitates} \ {\sf adoption} \ {\sf of} \ {\sf new} \ {\sf bank-related} \ {\sf technology} \ {\sf for} \ {\sf deposits}$

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Heterogeneity/variation:

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Heterogeneity/variation:

1. User/Household/District-level analysis

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 ⇒ Districts in the top quartile of ATM density

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 ⇒ Districts in the top quartile of ATM density
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 - ⇒ Banks' in the top quartile of ATM market share
 - ⇒ Bank-lending channel: Khwaja & Mian (2008)

Empirical Analysis

Mechanism

Mobile Money Tax:

↑ cost of Mobile Money

Mechanism

Mobile Money Tax: ↑ cost of Mobile Money ↓ Mobile Money

Mechanism

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Triggers shift in technology † adoption of bank-related innovation

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 \uparrow Deposits & \uparrow Cash & \uparrow ATM withdrawals

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Liquidity shock, but ...

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Liquidity shock, but ... deposits' turnover ↑

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 \uparrow Deposits & \uparrow Cash & \uparrow ATM withdrawals

Liquidity shock, but ... deposits' turnover ↑

⇒ loan maturity ↓

↓ Mobile Money

↓ Mobile Money

User level: Mobile Money data

Household level: Panel survey data

- ↓ Mobile Money
 - User level: Mobile Money data
 - Household level: Panel survey data

 \uparrow Adoption of new bank-related technology

- ↓ Mobile Money
 - User level: Mobile Money data
 - Household level: Panel survey data
- ↑ Adoption of new bank-related technology
 - District level

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 - User level: Mobile Money data
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 - District level
 - Bank level
- ↑ Credit market
 - Borrower level

Event study specification + DiD

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$$\log Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \sum_{\tau=1}^{T} \beta_{\tau} \mathsf{Month}_{\tau} \times \mathbf{I} \left[\mathsf{High ATM density} \right]_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

Event study specification + DiD

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- Individuals, districts: top quartile of ATM density
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Robustness: include Post $\mathsf{Tax}_t \times \mathbf{X}_i$ to rule out concurrent mechanisms

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Mobile Money ↓

Figure 1: Effect of Tax on Mobile Money usage




Table 1: Mobile Money usage: (log) value

	Sent	Received	Deposits	Withdrawals
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	-0.103***	-0.117***	-0.040***	-0.060***
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.005)
User FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Users	285044	450730	1171380	1382856
Adj. R sq.	0.438	0.349	0.407	0.448

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
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Similar results: using Rasul & Bassi (2017, AEJ:AE) on survey data

Adoption of bank-related technology \uparrow

New bank-related technology: district level


Figure 2: Technology adoption: number of banking agents



High ATM districts: on avg from 2 to 120 agents Low ATM districts: on avg from 0.1 to 8 agents

New bank-related technology: bank level

Figure 3: Technology adoption: number of banking agents



High ATM banks: on avg from 2 to 2200 agents Low ATM banks: on avg from 0.5 to 75 agents

Deposits \uparrow

Deposits: district level

Table 2: Inflow of deposits through new technology

	Volume		Value	
	Δ Log (1)	$\Delta \text{ Pr} > \text{median}$ (2)	Δ Log (3)	Δ Pr $>$ median (4)
$Tax\;dummy_t \times High\;ATM\;density_c$	2.327*** (0.391)	0.412*** (0.068)	7.866*** (1.307)	0.396*** (0.069)
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1840	1840	1840	1840
Adj. R sq.	0.637	0.509	0.621	0.507
Mean Dep. Var.	0.892	0.131	3.951	0.143

Deposits: district level

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Robustness: why different measures? See Chen & Roth (2024, QJE)

Deposits: district level

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	(0.391)	(0.068)	(1.307)	(0.069)
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	1840	1840	1840	1840
Adj. R sq.	0.637	0.509	0.621	0.507
Mean Dep. Var.	0.892	0.131	3.951	0.143


Robustness: why different measures? See Chen & Roth (2024, QJE)

Technology shift & Network effects: results in line with Crouzet et al. (2023, QJE)

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Deposits: district level

Figure 4: Inflow of bank deposits



High ATM: on avg from 571\$ to 1.1 million\$ Low ATM: on avg from 8\$ to 34'000\$

Volume of transactions

Deposits: bank level

Table: Bank deposits stock (log)

	Bank owned deposits	Time deposits	Savings deposits	Demand deposits	Cash stored
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post Tax × I[ATM Market share]	-0.039	-0.109	0.104		
	(0.199)	(0.155)	(0.068)		
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Obs.	831	831	831		
Adj. R sq.	0.442	0.949	0.997		
Mean Dep. Var.	1.848	31.439	30.504		

Deposits: bank level


Table: Bank deposits stock (log)

	Bank owned deposits	Time deposits	Savings deposits	Demand deposits	Cash stored
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post Tax \times I[ATM Market share]	-0.039 (0.199)	-0.109 (0.155)	0.104 (0.068)	0.131*** (0.044)	0.191** (0.071)
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	831	831	831	831	831
Adj. R sq.	0.442	0.949	0.997	0.992	0.984
Mean Dep. Var.	1.848	31.439	30.504	60.233	5.874

Cash \uparrow & ATM withdrawals \uparrow

Demand for cash: district level

Figure 5: % change in cash withdrawn by ATM density quartile




ATM withdrawals: bank level

Table 3: ATM withdrawals & Technology adoption

	ATM withdrawals		
	Log (1)	Log (2)	
Post Tax × I[ATM Market share]	0.029** (0.012)		
Post Tax \times Market share of urban ATMs		0.003*** (0.000)	
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	
Time FE	Yes	Yes	
Obs.	263	263	
Adj. R sq.	0.984	0.992	
Mean Dep. Var.	0.025	0.025	

ATM withdrawals: bank level



Mobile Money Tax induces:

Mobile Money Tax induces:

Drop in Mobile Money usage

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Adoption of banks' financial innovation

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Banks' financial innovation facilitates substitution of Mobile Money:

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Banks experience:

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Banks experience:

↑ inflow of money

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Banks experience:

↑ inflow of money

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New liquidity, but

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New liquidity, but high turnover

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New liquidity, but high turnover

⇒ higher turnover of cash: ↑ demand deposits' stock

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New liquidity, but high turnover

⇒ higher turnover of cash: ↑ demand deposits' stock

⇒ Credit market?

4. Credit registry


Khawja & Mian (2008) for estimating **bank lending channel**: control for (1) district \times time FE, (2) bank FE

$$\mathbf{Y}_{bdt} = \alpha_b + \alpha_{dt} + \mathsf{Post} \; \mathsf{Tax}_t \times \mathbf{I} \left[\mathsf{ATM} \; \mathsf{market} \; \mathsf{share} \right]_b + \epsilon_{bdt}$$

Outcome

- Term of repayment (log)
- 2 Total amount and number (log)
- Interest rate

Figure 6: Loans over time (log million \$)



Intensive margin: Credit amount

Outcome: log amount lent

- † credit to non-risky known borrowers
- ↓ credit to risky unknown borrowers

	w/ Credit history		w/o Credit History		
	Low risk (1)	High risk (2)	Low risk (3)	High risk (4)	
Tax dummy _{qy} \times I [ATM share] _b	0.152**	-0.027	-0.023	-0.043***	
-	(0.063)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.013)	
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
District-Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
N. of banks	26	22	26	21	
Adj. R sq.	0.372	0.329	0.357	0.141	
Mean Dep. Var.	0.251	0.059	0.189	0.034	



Credit length

Outcome: log term of repayment (in days)

↓ to all borrowers

	w/ Cred	it history	w/o Credit History		
	Low risk (1)	High risk (2)	Low risk (3)	High risk (4)	
Tax dummy _{qy} \times I [ATM share] _b	-0.459**	-0.155**	-0.455**	-0.162**	
	(0.180)	(0.110)	(0.195)	(0.068)	
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
District-Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
N. of banks	26	22	26	21	
Adj. R sq.	0.923	0.719	0.907	0.691	
Mean Dep. Var. (days)	1084.820	860.557	1219.507	853.978	

Credit cost

Outcome: interest rate

↑ credit to risky borrowers

	w/ Cred	it history	w/o Credit History		
	Low risk (1)	High risk (2)	Low risk (3)	High risk (4)	
Tax dummy _{av} \times I [ATM share] _b	0.681	5.130**	-2.966	3.588***	
,, -	(4.063)	(1.905)	(2.004)	(0.699)	
Bank FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
District-Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
N. of banks	26	22	26	21	
Adj. R sq.	0.892	0.725	0.831	0.750	
Mean Dep. Var.	22.690	26.240	23.460	26.964	

1. We study the effects of a digital money Tax in Uganda on substitution between mobile money, bank deposits & cash

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 - ightarrow Highly discussed policy in Africa

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 - → FinTech monopoly prevents financial innovation


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 - reduce maturity
 - transfer rent from high to low risk borrowers
- 3. Contribution to limited literature on regulation of fin. institutions & payment systems in LMICs


Appendix

Deposits: district level





Was the tax unexpected?





Telecom company



Mobile Money agent

Telecom company

> Mobile Money agent

Back

Mobile Money agent


User

Telecom company


Mobile Money agent

Users





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Telecom company

Cash

 $\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{Mobile} \ \mathsf{Money}_{\begin{subarray}{c} \leftarrow -----\\ \mathsf{agent} \end{subarray}} \ \mathsf{Users} \end{array}$



 $\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{Mobile}\;\mathsf{Money} \\ \mathsf{agent} \end{array} \longrightarrow \mathsf{User}$

Telecom company

Mobile Money

 $\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{Mobile}\;\mathsf{Money}_{-----}\\ \mathsf{agent} \end{array} \qquad \qquad \mathsf{Users}$

Back

User Mobile Money agent Telecom Mobile Money company Mobile Money agent Users



Statistics

Mobile Money

- Active users: 58% population
- Total value of all types of transactions: 56% of GDP
- Total value of P2P: 12.5% of GDP
- P2P: 1.92\$ average amount sent daily
- P2P: 82% within the district, 18% cross-district
- Median fee: 0.5% for P2P, 2.5% for withdrawal

Loans (to individuals):

- Maturity: average 645 days
- Annual Rate: average 27%
- Amount: average 1960\$

