

## Discussion of Paul, Ulate and Wu

A Macroeconomic Model of Central Bank Digital Currency



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#### The views expressed here are those of the presenter and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.

#### **General remarks**

#### Nice paper – clear and well written.

Very relevant topic in view of the **consequences** that a potential introduction of a **CBDC** may have.

- The paper develops a partial model for deposits,
- Then integrates it into a full DSGE model,
- And analyses deposits spreads, welfare and monetary policy transmission upon introduction of a CBDC.

Can only recommend reading it!

#### The mechanics

Welfare change of CBDC introduction operates through the endogenous deposit share,  $\omega_{\mathcal{L}}^d$ , and is U-shaped.

- CBDC reduces banks' monopoly rents,
- But induces deposit outflows that lower lending and GDP.
- The interest rate on CBDC is key:
- At a **low CBDC rate**, CBDC does not compete with deposits,  $\omega_{\mathcal{L}}^d$  not affected, CBDC introduction without effects on the economy.
- At a **high CBDC rate**, deposit outflows become large, bank disintermediation dominates positive effect.

**Optimal CBDC rate** for the US is **0.8%** for a steady-state policy rate of 2%.

### Comment: One or many economies?

"... instead of studying the introduction of CBDC for a specific economy, we analyze the effects of introducing CBDC in many economies that differ in the level of their steady-state policy rates."

Calibration changes the **discount factor**  $\beta$ , with other parameters constant.

Appendix C.4 recalibrates five parameters to match five target relations and shows that the **welfare-maximising CBDC rate** does **not change** much.

- Does the recalibration affect **welfare changes** from a zero-interest CBDC?
- The alternative economies are still **clones** of the **US**.
- The conclusions seem to suggest a **"rule**" over the business cycle. "Central banks can easily communicate this remuneration scheme..."

A side remark: How to think about a negative **steady-state** discount factor?

## Comment: How is CBDC introduced?

# Steady state without CBDC is modelled by assuming a CBDC interest rate of -100%.

- Is this equivalent to setting the weight on CBDC,  $\gamma_{cbdc}$ , to zero?
- $\gamma_{cbdc}$  enters the **liquidity aggregator**

$$\mathcal{L}_{t} = \left(\gamma_{m}^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} m_{t}^{\frac{\theta+1}{\theta}} + \gamma_{d}^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} d_{t}^{\frac{\theta+1}{\theta}} + \gamma_{cbdc}^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} cbdc_{t}^{\frac{\theta+1}{\theta}}\right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta+1}}$$

 A CBDC interest rate of -100% seems to imply that CBDC enters the "expenses" side of the HH's budget constraint via the cost-of-liquidity function, but not the "returns" side.

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## **CBDC** introduction and welfare

#### A CBDC will presumably not carry interest.

Welfare gain of CBDC introduction with zero interest rate is 22 basis points. Assenmacher, Ferrari Minesso, Mehl and Pagliari (2023) obtain a welfare gain of about 30 basis points.

Possible explanations for the differences:

- Introducing CBDC via an increase in the CBDC rate instead of adjusting  $\gamma_{cbdc}$  does not yield benefits through less liquidity costs.
- Assuming costs of holding/using cash.
- Calibration to the euro area.

## Transmission of monetary policy shocks

Results match with findings under different modelling setups.

Paper	Inflation reaction*		Output reaction*	
Assenmacher, Bitter, Ristiniemi (2022)	-0.02	0	-0.04	8
Ferrari Minesso, Mehl and Stracca (2022)	0.01	0	-0.02	0
Burlon, Muñoz and Smets (2023)	0	0	0	0

\* First column: Difference in peak reaction with and without CBDC in percentage points. Second column: Difference in half life with and without CBDC in months. Source: Assenmacher and Smets (2024)